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FD - Technical Tip: For XP you will need ServicePack1 or higher. Protocols targeted in this scanning include. SSL is used for downloading the applet and the remote desktop protocol itself. Not when you import your certificate through a file in PKCS 12 format. Of note, between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the SMI protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices. Wireless controller integrated into every FortiGate platform centralizes the management and monitoring of all FortiAP units.

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FortiClient VPN Connection getting stuck at Status: 98% (Solved)

Discovered that the problem was that I had special characters in my password. There was never any indication that special characters were not permitted, but sure enough, when I reset the password to something alphanumeric, it works. As the error states itself the most common problem is that either the username or the password isn't matching the one of the device.

I also experienced this issue, after a lot of trying I found out that the cause was that the user had a pending change of password in the domain. After changing the password unchecking the user must change the password on next login it worked fine again. Thank you for your interest in this question. Because it has attracted low-quality or spam answers that had to be removed, posting an answer now requires 10 reputation on this site the association bonus does not count.

Would you like to answer one of these unanswered questions instead? Home Questions Tags Users Unanswered. I get this error when it attempts to connect: We have tried it on two external Windows systems now, and get the same error on both systems. Did you reset the password for the user? Do the server logs give any hint?

I had no problems with special characters in the password. But allowing tunnel-mode was the key for me. Terminating these processes and removing associated processes and persistent files that execute the second stage malware would likely remove this malware from targeted devices.

On May 21, , new variants of the side-channel central processing unit CPU hardware vulnerabilities known as Spectre and Meltdown were publicly disclosed. These variants—known as 3A and 4—can allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems. Common CPU hardware implementations are vulnerable to the side-channel attacks known as Spectre and Meltdown.

Meltdown is a bug that "melts" the security boundaries normally enforced by the hardware, affecting desktops, laptops, and cloud computers. Spectre is a flaw that an attacker can exploit to force a CPU to reveal its data. Variant 3a is a vulnerability that may allow an attacker with local access to speculatively read system parameters via side-channel analysis and obtain sensitive information.

While implementation is complex, this side-channel vulnerability could allow less privileged code to. Side-Channel Vulnerability Variants 3a and 4 may allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems. The following table contains links to advisories and patches published in response to the vulnerabilities.

This table will be updated as information becomes available. Specifically, the industry partner reported the actors redirected DNS queries to their own infrastructure by creating GRE tunnels and obtained sensitive information, which include the configuration files of networked devices.

NCCIC encourages organizations to use the detection and prevention guidelines outlined in this Alert to help defend against this activity. For instance, administrators should inspect the presence of protocol 47 traffic flowing to or from unexpected addresses, or unexplained presence of GRE tunnel creation, modification, or destruction in log files.

This TA provides information on the worldwide cyber exploitation of network infrastructure devices e. Targets are primarily government and private-sector organizations, critical infrastructure providers, and the Internet service providers ISPs supporting these sectors.

This report contains technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs used by Russian state-sponsored cyber actors to compromise victims. Victims were identified through a coordinated series of actions between U. FBI has high confidence that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors are using compromised routers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks to support espionage, extract intellectual property, maintain persistent access to victim networks, and potentially lay a foundation for future offensive operations.

Governments, allied governments, network device manufacturers, and private-sector security organizations. Elements from these alerts and advisories have been selected and disseminated in a wide variety of security news outlets and social media platforms.

The current state of U. The purpose of this TA is to inform network device vendors, ISPs, public-sector organizations, private-sector corporations, and small office home office SOHO customers about the Russian government campaign, provide information to identify malicious activity, and reduce exposure to this activity.

Since , the U. Government assesses that cyber actors supported by the Russian government carried out this worldwide campaign. Russian cyber actors leverage a number of legacy or weak protocols and service ports associated with network administration activities.

Cyber actors use these weaknesses to. Additionally, Russian cyber actors could potentially modify or deny traffic traversing through the router. Russian cyber actors do not need to leverage zero-day vulnerabilities or install malware to exploit these devices.

Instead, cyber actors take advantage of the following vulnerabilities:. These factors allow for both intermittent and persistent access to both intellectual property and U.

Network devices are ideal targets. Most or all organizational and customer traffic must traverse these critical devices. Organizations that use legacy, unencrypted protocols to manage hosts and services, make successful credential harvesting easy for these actors. An actor controlling a router between Industrial Control Systems — Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition ICS-SCADA sensors and controllers in a critical infrastructure—such as the Energy Sector—can manipulate the messages, creating dangerous configurations that could lead to loss of service or physical destruction.

Whoever controls the routing infrastructure of a network essentially controls the data flowing through the network. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have conducted both broad-scale and targeted scanning of Internet address spaces. Such scanning allows these actors to identify enabled Internet-facing ports and services, conduct device fingerprinting, and discover vulnerable network infrastructure devices.

Protocols targeted in this scanning include. Login banners and other data collected from enabled services can reveal the make and model of the device and information about the organization for future engagement. Device configuration files extracted in previous operations can enhance the reconnaissance effort and allow these actors to refine their methodology.

The design of SMI directors and clients requires the director and clients to be on the same network. The configuration file contains a significant amount of information about the scanned device, including password hash values. These values allow cyber actors to derive legitimate credentials.

The configuration file also contains SNMP community strings and other network information that allows the cyber actors to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation. Legitimate user masquerade is the primary method by which these cyber actors exploit targeted network devices. In some cases, the actors use brute-force attacks to obtain Telnet and SSH login credentials.

However, for the most part, cyber actors are able to easily obtain legitimate credentials, which they then use to access routers. Organizations that permit default or commonly used passwords, have weak password policies, or permit passwords that can be derived from credential-harvesting activities, allow cyber actors to easily guess or access legitimate user credentials. Cyber actors can also access legitimate credentials by extracting password hash values from configurations sent by owners and operators across the Internet or by SNMP and SMI scanning.

Armed with the legitimate credentials, cyber actors can authenticate into the device as a privileged user via remote management services such as Telnet, SSH, or the web management interface.

SMI is an unauthenticated management protocol developed by Cisco. This protocol supports a feature that allows network administrators to download or overwrite any file on any Cisco router or switch that supports this feature.

This feature is designed to enable network administrators to remotely install and configure new devices and install new OS files. Commercial and government security organizations have noted that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have leveraged the SIET to abuse SMI to download current configuration files. Of concern, any actor may leverage this capability to overwrite files to modify the device configurations, or upload maliciously modified OS or firmware to enable persistence.

Additionally, these network devices have writeable file structures where malware for other platforms may be stored to support lateral movement throughout the targeted network. Cyber actors masquerade as legitimate users to log into a device or establish a connection via a previously uploaded OS image with a backdoor.

Once successfully logged into the device, cyber actors execute privileged commands. These cyber actors create a man-in-the-middle scenario that allows them to. At this stage, cyber actors are not restricted from modifying or denying traffic to and from the victim. Although there are no reports of this activity, it is technically possible. Review network device logs and netflow data for indications of TCP Telnet-protocol traffic directed at port 23 on all network device hosts.

Although Telnet may be directed at other ports e. Inspect any indication of Telnet sessions or attempts. Because Telnet is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal command line interface CLI command sequences appropriate for the make and model of the device.

CLI strings may reveal login procedures, presentation of user credentials, commands to display boot or running configuration, copying files and creation or destruction of GRE tunnels, etc. Because SNMP is a management tool, any such traffic that is not from a trusted management host on an internal network should be investigated. Review the source address of SNMP traffic for indications of addresses that spoof the address space of the network. Because TFTP is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal strings associated with configuration data appropriate for the make and model of the device.

Review network device logs and netflow data for indications of TCP SMI protocol traffic directed at port of all network-device hosts. Because SMI is a management feature, any traffic that is not from a trusted management host on an internal network should be investigated.

Of note, between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the SMI protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices. Two Russian cyber actors controlled hosts Because TFTP is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal strings appropriate for the make and model of the device. The following signature may be used to detect SMI usage. Flag as suspicious and investigate SMI traffic arriving from outside the network boundary.

If SMI is not used inside the network, any SMI traffic arriving on an internal interface should be flagged as suspicious and investigated for the existence of an unauthorized SMI director. If SMI is used inside the network, ensure that the traffic is coming from an authorized SMI director, and not from a bogus director. In general, exploitation attempts with the SIET tool will likely arrive from outside the network boundary.

However, before attempting to tune or limit the range of these signatures, i. Inspect the presence of protocol 47 traffic flowing to or from unexpected addresses, or unexplained presence of GRE tunnel creation, modification, or destruction in log files. There is a significant amount of publically available cybersecurity guidance and best practices from DHS, allied government, vendors, and the private-sector cybersecurity community on mitigation strategies for the exploitation vectors described above.

The following are additional mitigations for network device manufacturers, ISPs, and owners or operators. Operating System Fingerprinting is analyzing characteristics of packets sent by a target, such as packet headers or listening ports, to identify the operating system in use on the target. Spear phishing is an attempt by an individual or group to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by employing social engineering techniques.

Phishing emails are crafted to appear as if they were sent from a legitimate organization or known individual. These emails often attempt to entice users to click on a link that will take the user to a fraudulent website that appears legitimate.

The user then may be asked to provide personal information, such as account usernames and passwords, which can further expose them to future compromises. In a watering hole attack , the attacker compromises a site likely to be visited by a particular target group, rather than attacking the target group directly. DHS encourages recipients who identify the use of tools or techniques discussed in this document to report information to NCCIC or law enforcement immediately.

Commands associated with Cisco IOS. These strings may be seen in inbound network traffic of unencrypted management tools such as Telnet or HTTP, in the logs of application layer firewalls, or in the logs of network devices.

Network device owners and operators should review the Cisco documentation of their particular makes and models for strings that would allow the owner or operator to customize the list for an Intrusion Detection System IDS. Detecting commands from Internet-based hosts should be a cause for concern and further investigation. Detecting these strings in network traffic or log files does not confirm compromise.

Further analysis is necessary to remove false positives. This is a subset of the possible strings. Network device owners and operators should export the configuration of their particular makes and models to a secure host and examine it for strings that would allow the owner or operator to customize the list for an IDS. Detecting outbound configuration data leaving an organization destined for Internet-based hosts should be a cause for concern and further investigation to ensure the destination is authorized to receive the configuration data.

Because configuration data provides an adversary with information—such as the password hashes—to enable future attacks, configuration data should be encrypted between sender and receiver. In such cases, the outbound file would be sent via TFTP.

Russian state-sponsored cyber actors could potentially target the network devices from other manufacturers. Therefore, operators and owners should review the documentation associated with the make and model they have in operation to identify strings associated with administrative functions.

Export the current configuration and identify strings associated with the configuration. Place the device-specific administrative and configuration strings into network-based and host-based IDS. Examples for MicroTic may include: See the documentation for your make and model for specific strings and parameters to place on watch.

These strings may be seen in inbound network traffic of unencrypted management tools such as Telnet or HTTP, in the logs of application layer firewalls or network devices.

Between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the Cisco Smart Install protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices.

Two Russian cyber actor-controlled hosts, In early July , the commands sent to targets changed slightly, copying the running configuration file instead of the startup configuration file. Additionally, the second command copies the file saved to flash memory instead of directly copying the configuration file. According to information derived from FBI investigations, malicious cyber actors are increasingly using a style of brute force attack known as password spraying against organizations in the United States and abroad.

On February , the Department of Justice in the Southern District of New York, indicted nine Iranian nationals, who were associated with the Mabna Institute, for computer intrusion offenses related to activity described in this report. The techniques and activity described herein, while characteristic of Mabna actors, are not limited solely to use by this group. In a traditional brute-force attack, a malicious actor attempts to gain unauthorized access to a single account by guessing the password.

This can quickly result in a targeted account getting locked-out, as commonly used account-lockout policies allow three to five bad attempts during a set period of time. This technique allows the actor to remain undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts. Password spray campaigns typically target single sign-on SSO and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols.

An actor may target this specific protocol because federated authentication can help mask malicious traffic.

Additionally, by targeting SSO applications, malicious actors hope to maximize access to intellectual property during a successful compromise. Email applications are also targeted. Traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs for conducting the password-spray attacks are as follows:. The vast majority of known password spray victims share some of the following characteristics [1] [2]:. A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and sensitive information is exposed.

CyWatch can be contacted by phone at or by e-mail at CyWatch ic. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. This alert provides information on Russian government actions targeting U. Government entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.

It also contains indicators of compromise IOCs and technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs used by Russian government cyber actors on compromised victim networks. DHS and FBI produced this alert to educate network defenders to enhance their ability to identify and reduce exposure to malicious activity. After obtaining access, the Russian government cyber actors conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally, and collected information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems ICS.

Contact DHS or law enforcement immediately to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance. Analysis by DHS and FBI, resulted in the identification of distinct indicators and behaviors related to this activity. Of note, the report Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group, released by Symantec on September 6, , provides additional information about this ongoing campaign.

This campaign comprises two distinct categories of victims: Phases of the model include reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on the objective.

The threat actors appear to have deliberately chosen the organizations they targeted, rather than pursuing them as targets of opportunity. Staging targets held preexisting relationships with many of the intended targets. DHS analysis identified the threat actors accessing publicly available information hosted by organization-monitored networks during the reconnaissance phase.

Based on forensic analysis, DHS assesses the threat actors sought information on network and organizational design and control system capabilities within organizations.

These tactics are commonly used to collect the information needed for targeted spear-phishing attempts. In some cases, information posted to company websites, especially information that may appear to be innocuous, may contain operationally sensitive information. As an example, the threat actors downloaded a small photo from a publicly accessible human resources page. The image, when expanded, was a high-resolution photo that displayed control systems equipment models and status information in the background.

Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network VPN connections. Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block SMB protocol.

An example of this request is: After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication.

Threat actors compromised the infrastructure of trusted organizations to reach intended targets. Although these watering holes may host legitimate content developed by reputable organizations, the threat actors altered websites to contain and reference malicious content.

The threat actors used legitimate credentials to access and directly modify the website content. This request accomplishes a similar technique observed in the spear-phishing documents for credential harvesting.

The file was modified to contain the contents below:. When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs. Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name. The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code. The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password.

In previous reporting, DHS and FBI noted that all of these spear-phishing emails referred to control systems or process control systems. The threat actors continued using these themes specifically against intended target organizations.

Email messages included references to common industrial control equipment and protocols. The threat actors used distinct and unusual TTPs in the phishing campaign directed at staging targets. Emails contained successive redirects to http: When exploiting the intended targets, the threat actors used malicious.

This connection is made to a command and control C2 server—either a server owned by the threat actors or that of a victim. When a user attempted to authenticate to the domain, the C2 server was provided with the hash of the password. Local users received a graphical user interface GUI prompt to enter a username and password, and the C2 received this information over TCP ports or The threat actors used scripts to create local administrator accounts disguised as legitimate backup accounts.

The script then attempted to add the newly created account to the administrators group to gain elevated privileges.

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May 27,  · If your connection using wireless then change MTU on "Wirelless Network Connection". FortiClient is a top performer and "Recommended" by NSS labs in its Advanced Endpoint Protection (AEP) group test. NSS Labs expanded the scope of the AEP test and included malware, exploits, blended threats (combinations of threats), false . Configuring SSL VPN web portals. The SSL VPN portal enables remote users to access internal network resources through a secure channel using a web browser.